G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014 THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL

 G.R. No. 175723,               February 4, 2014

THE CITY OF MANILA ETC., ET AL. v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO ETC., ET AL

PERALTA, J.:

NATURE:

This is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Resolutions¹ dated April 6, 2006 and November 29, 2006 of the Court of Appeals.

FACTS:

Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, petitioner Liberty Toledo, assessed taxes for the taxable period from January to December 2002 against the private respondents.In addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes. private respondents were constrained to pay the P 19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

On January 24, 2004, private respondents filed before the RTC of Pasay City the complaint denominated as one for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously–Collected Local Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction

The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration⁴ but the RTC denied. Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA but the CA dismissed petitioners’ petition for certiorari holding that it has no jurisdiction over the said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,⁷ but the CA denied it in its Resolution hence, this petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

HELD:

The CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case. In order for any appellate court to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the authority to issue, among others, a writ of certiorari. In transferring exclusive jurisdiction over appealed tax cases to the CTA, it can reasonably be assumed that the law intended to transfer also such power as is deemed necessary, if not indispensable, in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. There is no perceivable reason why the transfer should only be considered as partial, not total.

Consistent with the above pronouncement, the Court has held as early as the case of J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Jaramillo, et al. [118 Phil. 1022 (1963)] that “if a case may be appealed to a particular court or judicial tribunal or body, then said court or judicial tribunal or body has jurisdiction to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.” This principle was affirmed in De Jesus v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 101630, August 24, 1992) where the Court stated that “a court may issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction if said court has jurisdiction to review, by appeal or writ of error, the final orders or decisions of the lower court.

FALLO: petition is denied

G.R. No. 199439 April 22, 2014 CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 199439               April 22, 2014

CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, represented by its Mayor, HON. DARLENE MAGNOLIA R. ANTONINO-CUSTODIO Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.

LEONEN, J.:

NATURE:

This is a special civil action for certiorari  filed by  the city of General Santos asking to find grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Audit (COA).which affirmed the findings of its Legal Services Sector in its Opinion No. 2010-021 declaring Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as illegal. 

FACTS:

Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its implementing rules and regulations, designed "to entice those employees who were unproductive due to health reasons to avail of the incentives being offered therein by way of early retirement package."⁶

This contextual background in the passing of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was not contested by respondent Commission on Audit.

In response to the endorsement of the city audit team leader, respondent Commission’s regional director agreed that the grant lacked legal basis and was contrary to the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) Act. He forwarded the matter to respondent Commission’s Office of General Counsel, Legal Services Sector.

The Office of General Counsel issued COA-LSS Opinion No. 2010-021. Respondent Commission on Audit observed that GenSan SERVES was not based on a law passed by Congress but on ordinances and resolutions passed and approved by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Executive Orders by the city mayor.²⁶ Moreover, nowhere in Section 76 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, does it provide a specific power for local government units to establish an early retirement program.

ISSUE:

WHETHER RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON AUDIT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT CONSIDERED ORDINANCE NO. 08, SERIES OF 2009, IN THE NATURE OF AN EARLY RETIREMENT PROGRAM REQUIRING A LAW AUTHORIZING IT FOR ITS VALIDITY

HELD:

The Court agree with respondent Commission on Audit but only insofar as the invalidity of Section 5 of the ordinance is concerned.

Section 5. GenSan SERVES Program Incentives On Top of Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and PAG-IBIG Benefits – Any personnel qualified and approved to receive the incentives of this program shall be entitled to whatever retirement benefits the GSIS or PAG-IBIG is granting to a retiring government employee.

Moreover, an eligible employee shall receive an early retirement incentive provided under this program at the rate of one and one-half (1 1/2) months of the employee’s latest basic salary for every year of service in the City Government.⁹

Section 5 refers to an "early retirement incentive," the amount of which is pegged on the beneficiary’s years of service in the city government. The ordinance provides that only those who have rendered service to the city government for at least 15 years may apply.⁷⁵ Consequently, this provision falls under the definition of a retirement benefit. Applying the definition in Conte, it is a form of reward for an employee’s loyalty and service to the city government, and it is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his or her life by lessening his or her financial worries.

Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the creation of any insurance or retirement plan – other than the GSIS – for government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and inequitous proliferation of such plans. x x x. To ignore this and rule otherwise would be tantamount to permitting every other government office or agency to put up its own supplementary retirement benefit plan under the guise of such "financial assistance.⁷¹

The Court declares Section 6 on post-retirement incentives as valid.

FALLO:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Commission on Audit decision dated January 20, 2011 and resolution dated October 17, 2011 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION insofar as Section 6 of Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, as amended by Ordinance No. 11, series of 2009, is declared as VALID.

G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013 FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL,

G.R. No. 202242               April 16, 2013

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR.,Respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

NATURE:

The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the JBC in a prior decision rendered July 17, 2012 that JBC’s action of allowing more than one member of the congress to represent the JBC to be unconstitutional

FACTS:

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each. Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition. it should mean one representative each from both Houses which comprise the entire Congress. Respondent contends that the phrase “ a representative of congress” refers that both houses of congress should have one representative each, and that these two houses are permanent and mandatory components of “congress” as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their duties. Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one representative from congress.

ISSUE:

Whether the JBC’s practice of having members from the Senate and the House of Representatives making 8 instead of 7 sitting members to be unconstitutional as provided in Art VIII Sec 8 of the constitution.

HELD: Yes. The practice is unconstitutional; the court held that the phrase “a representative of congress” should be construed as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both. That the framers of the constitution only intended for one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative.

It is evident that the definition of “Congress” as a bicameral body refers to its primary function in government – to legislate. In the passage of laws, the Constitution is explicit in the distinction of the role of each house in the process. The same holds true in Congress’ non-legislative powers. An inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the realization of these powers causing a vivid dichotomy that the Court cannot simply discount. This, however, cannot be said in the case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department. The Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.

FALLO: The motion was denied.

G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013 BELGICA vs. HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

G.R. No. 208566               November 19, 2013

GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA JOSE M. VILLEGAS JR. JOSE L. GONZALEZ REUBEN M. ABANTE and QUINTIN PAREDES SAN DIEGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA JR, et al, Respondents

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

NATURE:

These are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

FACTS:

The NBI Investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (Janet Lim Napoles) had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost projects" using dummy NGOs. Thus, Criminal complaints were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery, and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Also recommended to be charged in the complaints are some of the lawmakers’ chiefs -of-staff or representatives, the heads and other officials of three (3) implementing agencies, and the several presidents of the NGOs set up by Napoles.

Whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO. Several petitions were lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional

G.R. No. 208493 – SJS filed a Petition for Prohibition seeking that the "Pork Barrel System" be declared unconstitutional, and a writ of prohibition be issued permanently

G.R. No. 208566 - Belgica, et al filed an Urgent Petition For Certiorari and Prohibition With Prayer For The Immediate Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum, discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.  Also, they pray that the Court issue a TRO against respondents

UDK-14951 – A Petition filed seeking that the PDAF be declared unconstitutional, and a cease and desist order be issued restraining President Benigno Simeon S. Aquino III (President Aquino) and Secretary Abad from releasing such funds to Members of Congress

ISSUES:

1.       Whether or not the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation of powers; (b) non-delegability of legislative power; (c) checks and balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local autonomy.

2.       Whether or not the phrases (under Section 8 of PD 910,¹¹⁶ relating to the Malampaya Funds, and under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.

HELD:

1.       Yes, the PDAF article is unconstitutional. The post-enactment measures which govern the areas of project identification, fund release and fund realignment are not related to functions of congressional oversight and, hence, allow legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that properly belong to the sphere of budget execution. This violates the principle of separation of powers. Congress‘role must be confined to mere oversight that must be confined to:  (1) scrutiny and (2) investigation and monitoring of the implementation of laws. Any action or step beyond that will undermine the separation of powers guaranteed by the constitution.

Thus, the court declares the 2013 pdaf article as well as all other provisions of law which similarly allow legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the implementation or enforcement of the budget, unrelated to congressional oversight, as violative of the separation of powers principle and thus unconstitutional.

2.       Yes. Sec 8 of PD 910- the phrase “and for such other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President”‖ constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the President‘s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya Funds may be used. It gives the President wide latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the purview of the law.”

Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993- the phrases:

(b) "to finance the priority infrastructure development projects” was declared constitutional. IT INDICATED PURPOSE ADEQUATELY CURTAILS THE AUTHORITY OF THE PRESIDENT TO SPEND THE PRESIDENTIAL SOCIAL FUND ONLY FOR RESTORATION PURPOSES WHICH ARISE FROM CALAMITIES.

(b)” and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the Philippines” was declared unconstitutional.IT GIVES THE PRESIDENT CARTE BLANCHE AUTHORITY TO USE THE SAME FUND FOR ANY INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT HE MAY SO DETERMINE AS A ―PRIORITY‖. VERILY, THE LAW DOES NOT SUPPLY A DEFINITION OF ―PRIORITY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS‖ AND HENCE, LEAVES THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ANY GUIDELINE TO CONSTRUE THE SAME.

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015 ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONER-INTERVENOR,

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

NATURE:

These are petitions including:

1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which essentially prays for the issuance of the writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013  and April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively.

(2) a Petition-in-Intervention^[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada’s) disqualification to run for and hold public office

FACTS:

On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification.

On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is hereby restored to his civil and political rights.

On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy^[7] for the position of President but was opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification. None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.

On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy,^[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.

Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of Estrada’s Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)

In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.

Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by former President Arroyo.

HELD:

No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions were issued in a “whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty enjoined by law” or were so “patent and gross” as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.

Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him

While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office, whether local or national position.

FALLO:

Petition is dismissed

G.R. No. 199082 July 23, 2013 JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

G.R. No. 199082               July 23, 2013

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner,
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; et al, Respondents.

PERALTA, J.:

NATURE:

These are separate motions for reconsideration filed by movants Gloria Macapagal Arroyo  in G.R. No. 199118 and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo in G.R. No. 199082 praying that the Court take a second look at our September 18, 2012 Decision³ dismissing their petitions and supplemental petitions against respondents Commission on Elections (Comelec), the Department of Justice (DOJ), Senator Aquilino M. Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel), Joint DOJ-Comelec Preliminary Investigation Committee (Joint Committee) and DOJ-Comelec Fact-Finding Team (Fact-Finding Team), et al.

FACTS:

On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued a Joint Order creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases

In its Initial Report of the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato, and Maguindanao was indeed perpetrated. It recommended that Petitioner Benjamin S. Abalos, GMA, and Mike Arroyo be subjected to preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage and manipulating the election results.

Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint Panel.

On September 18, 2012, the Court rendered the assailed Decision. It ruled that:

1.    Fact- Finding Team’s Initial Report dated October 20, 2011, are declared VALID. However, the Rules of Procedure on the Conduct of Preliminary Investigation on the Alleged Election Fraud in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections is declared INEFFECTIVE for lack of publication.

2.    The Joint Panel and the proceedings having been conducted in accordance with Rule 112 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and Rule 34 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure, the conduct of the preliminary investigation is hereby declared VALID.

ISSUES:

1.    Whether or not the creation of the Joint Panel undermines the decisional independence of the Comelec.

2.    Whether or not the DOJ should conduct preliminary investigation only when deputized by the Comelec but not exercise concurrent jurisdiction

HELD:

1.    The grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the Comelec and the DOJ nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure.⁴⁵ With more reason, therefore, that we the the court cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the Comelec’s independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution

2.     The creation of a Joint Committee is not repugnant to the concept of "concurrent jurisdiction" authorized by the amendatory law The doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction means equal jurisdiction to deal with the same subject matter. Contrary to the contention of the petitioners, there is no prohibition on simultaneous exercise of power between two coordinate bodies. What is prohibited is the situation where one files a complaint against a respondent initially with one office (such as the Comelec) for preliminary investigation which was immediately acted upon by said office and the re-filing of substantially the same complaint with another office (such as the DOJ). The subsequent assumption of jurisdiction by the second office over the cases filed will not be allowed. Indeed, it is a settled rule that the body or agency that first takes cognizance of the complaint shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of the others.

FALLO: petition is denied

G.R. No. 192803 December 10, 2013 ARARO PARTY-LIST vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. 192803               December 10, 2013

ALLIANCE FOR RURAL AND AGRARIAN RECONSTRUCTION, INC., ALSO KNOWN AS ARARO PARTY-LIST,Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

LEONEN, J:

NATURE:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by a party-list group that ran for the 2010 national elections. The petitioner questions the validity of the formula used by the Commission on Elections in determining and proclaiming the winning party-list groups.

FACTS:

Petitioner, ARARO was a duly accredited party-list garnered a total of 147,204 votes in the May 10, 2010 elections and ranked 50th. The COMELEC En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers initially proclaimed twenty-eight (28) party-list organizations as winners involving a total of thirty-five (35) seats guaranteed and additional seats. The petitioner questioned the formula used by the COMELEC and filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order

The petitioner suggests that the formula used by the Commission on Elections is flawed because votes that were spoiled or that were not made for any party-lists were not counted. According to the petitioner, around seven million (7,000,000) votes were disregarded as a result of the Commission on Elections’ erroneous interpretation. 7,112,792 (Total number of disregarded votes according to petitioner ARARO)

On the other hand, the formula used by the Commission on Elections En Banc sitting as the National Board of Canvassers is the following:

Number of seats available to legislative districts_x .20 =Number of seats available to party-list representatives .80

Thus, the total number of party-list seats available for the May 2010 elections is 57 as shown below:

229__x .20 =57 .80

The National Board of Canvassers’ Resolution No. 10-009 applies the formula used in Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC¹⁸ to arrive at the winning party-list groups and their guaranteed seats, where:

Number of votes of party-list

______________________________=

Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list

Total number of votes for party-list candidates

the Commission on Elections through the Office of the Solicitor General took the position that invalid or stray votes should not be counted in determining the divisor. The Commission on Elections argues that this will contradict Citizens’ Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) v. COMELEC²² and Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC.²³ It asserts that:

Neither can the phrase be construed to include the number of voters who did not even vote for any qualified party-list candidate, as these voters cannot be considered to have cast any vote "for the party-list system."²⁴

I. Whether the case is already moot and academic

II. Whether petitioners have legal standing

III. Whether the Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion in its interpretation of the formula used in BANAT v. COMELEC²⁵ to determine the party-list groups that would be proclaimed in the 2010 elections

The third issue requires our determination of the computation of the correct divisor to be used. The options are

HELD:

1.    This case is moot and academic but the Court discussed the issues raised by the petitioner as these are capable of repetition yet evading review³² and for the guidance of the bench, bar, and public.³³

2.    The computation proposed by petitioner ARARO even lowers its chances to meet the 2% threshold required by law for a guaranteed seat. Its arguments will neither benefit nor injure the party. Thus, it has no legal standing to raise the argument in this Court.

3.    The Court agree with the petitioner but only to the extent that votes later on determined to be invalid due to no cause attributable to the voter should not be excluded in the divisor. In other words, votes cast validly for a party-list group listed in the ballot but later on disqualified should be counted as part of the divisor. To do otherwise would be to disenfranchise the voters who voted on the basis of good faith that that ballot contained all the qualified candidates. However, following this rationale, party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor.

Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 7941 is clear that only those votes cast for the party-list system shall be considered in the computation of the percentage of representation:

1.    (b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list systemshall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes: Provided, finally, That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

 The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED as follows:

Number of votes. of party-list Total number of valid votes for party-list candidates Proportion or Percentage of votes garnered by party-list

The divisor shall be the total number of valid votes cast for the party-list system including votes cast for party-list groups whose names are in the ballot but are subsequently disqualified. Party-list groups listed in the ballot but whose disqualification attained finality prior to the elections and whose disqualification was reasonably made known by the Commission on Elections to the voters prior to such elections should not be included in the divisor. The divisor shall also not include votes that are declared spoiled or invalid.

FALLO:

1. The prayer to enjoin the Commission on Elections from proclaiming the qualified party-list groups is denied for being moot and academic;

2. The formula in determining the winning party-list groups, as used and interpreted in the case of BANAT v. COMELEC, is MODIFIED